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literature on spatial price-quality competition along several dimensions, including util-
ity functions that are non-linear in income and cost functions that are non-separable
in output and quality. Our main message is that the scope for a positive relationship
between competition and quality is underestimated in the existing literature. If we
allow for income e¤ects by assuming that utility is strictly concave in income, we
nd that lower transportation costs always lead to higher quality. The presence of in-
come e¤ects might also reverse a previously reported negative relationship between the
number of 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1 Introduction
Does more competition induce rms to produce higher-quality goods? If prices are exoge-
nous (e.g., due to price regulation), more competition will increase quality if prices are
above marginal costs. This is a well established result in the literature on spatial compe-
tition.1 However, if prices are endogenously set by rms, then the e¤ect of competition on
quality incentives is uncertain. While more competition increases the incentives to supply
high quality for given prices, more competition also reduces the price-cost margin, which,
in turn, reduces the incentives to invest in quality. Thus, the net e¤ect of competition on
quality is generally ambiguous under price competition.
Intensity of competition is often measured either as an increase in the number of rms
in the market or as a reduction in the degree of horizontal product di¤erentiation (or
transportation costs). Using the latter measure, Ma and Burgess (1993) report no e¤ect
of less product di¤erentiation on quality incentives. In their paper, the direct e¤ect of
more competition on quality incentives is exactly o¤set by the indirect e¤ect via lower
prices. The same result is reported by Gravelle (1999). Using the number of rms as a
competition measure, Economides (1993) nds that more rms in the market reduces the
incentives to invest in quality. Since a higher number of rms reduces the potential demand
for each single rm, the returns to quality investments are correspondingly reduced.
In the present paper, we revisit the existing literature on price and quality competition
in a spatial framework. We use a Salop-type model where rms have di¤erent locations,
referring to product space or geographical space. In this set-up, we allow for price-quality
competition. For the main part of the analysis, we assume that rms choose price and
quality simultaneously. In an extension to the main model, we also allow for sequential
choices, where quality is treated more as a long term variable. We take a closer look
at the e¤ects of spatial competition on quality and prices by generalising previous work
along several dimensions. First, we allow for income e¤ects by assuming that the utility
function is concave in the numeraire good. Second, we decompose the transportation
1See, e.g., Ma and Burgess (1993), Calem and Rizzo (1995), Wolinsky (1997), Brekke, Nuscheler and
Straume (2006, 2007).
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costs into monetary and non-monetary costs. While non-monetary transportation costs
a¤ect utility directly, monetary transportation costs add to the consumption expenditures
and a¤ect utility through the budget constraint. This distinction should be particularly
relevant with respect to di¤erent interpretations of rm location (product space versus
geographical space). Third, we apply general benet and production cost functions where
we allow for quality and output to be either cost complements or cost substitutes.
One of our main results is that the relationship between competition and quality de-
pends crucially on the presence of income e¤ects; i.e., whether utility is linear or strictly
concave in income. If utility is linear in income, more competition as measured by lower
transportation costs  leads to lower prices but has no e¤ect on quality, since the two
aforementioned e¤ects exactly cancel each other out (as in Ma and Burgess, 1993, and
Gravelle, 1999). Clearly, this is a special case. If we allow for utility to be strictly concave
in income, the dampening e¤ect of competition on quality incentives via a lower price-cost
margin is smaller, implying that the net e¤ect is positive: lower transportation costs al-
ways lead to higher quality in equilibrium. This conclusion holds regardless of whether we
are considering monetary or non-monetary transportation costs. In a simplied version of
the model, we also show that this conclusion is robust to the case where quality and price
choices are made sequentially.
The only qualitative di¤erence between monetary and non-monetary transportation
costs is that lower monetary transportation costs (as opposed to non-monetary ones) might
lead to higher, rather than lower, prices in equilibrium if the degree of cost substitutability
between quality and output is su¢ ciently strong. The degree of cost substitutability is also
important in determining the quality e¤ects of a higher number of rms in the market.
With constant marginal utility of income and cost independence between quality and
output, we replicate the result by Economides (1993) that more rms lead to lower quality.
However, we show that this result is reversed for a su¢ cient degree of cost substitutability
(more rms increase quality). Furthermore, with decreasing marginal utility of income we
can establish a positive relationship between rm density and equilibrium quality even for
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(mild) cost complementarities.
We also derive and characterise the socially optimal quality level, nding that the
Nash equilibrium quality level is never socially excessive. If utility is linear in income,
equilibrium quality coincides with the socially optimal level. This result is well known
from the literature (Ma and Burgess, 1993; Gravelle, 1999) and is due to the marginal
utility being equal for the marginal and average consumer.2 ;3 However, if utility is strictly
concave in income, the marginal utility is higher for the marginal than for the average
consumer in the Nash equilibrium, implying that the equilibrium supply of quality is
below the socially optimal level.
As indicated above, the papers closest to ours are Ma and Burgess (1993), Economides
(1993) and Gravelle (1999), who all studied, in various ways, the e¤ect of spatial competi-
tion on prices and quality. While the e¤ect of competition on prices is less ambiguous, and
thus perhaps less interesting, the relationship between competition and quality is far from
clear-cut. In fact, the existing literature suggests that we cannot expect rms to provide
higher quality as a result of more competition. Our main message is that this conclusion
is too pessimistic. In a more general framework we show that the special assumptions of
linear utility functions and cost separability between quality and output are not innocuous
and have led to an underestimation of the scope for competition to improve quality.
In addition to the three key papers cited above, there are also other papers that
analyse the relationship between competition and quality using di¤erent types of modelling
framework. Incorporating product quality into an oligopoly model with a Marshallian-
type demand system, Banker et al. (1998) use several di¤erent measures of the degree of
competition and conclude that the e¤ect of increased competition on quality is generally
ambiguous in all cases considered. In a very di¤erent setting, where rms and consumers
interact repeatedly and quality is only ex-post observable, Kranton (2003) extends the
2This criterion was rst established by Spence (1975).
3 In a model where quality a¤ects the degree of perceived horizontal di¤erentiation, Degryse and Irmen
(2001) show that rmsprivate incentives for quality provision generally depart from the socially optimal
ones. When quality and price decisions are made simultaneously, they nd that quality provision is socially
excessive if the correlation between quality and horizontal di¤erentiation is negative. The relationship
between competition and quality is not an issue in the paper.
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previous literature on reputation-based quality incentives (e.g., Klein and Le­ er, 1981;
Shapiro, 1983; Allen, 1984) to show that competition between rms might eliminate perfect
equilibria in which rms produce high-quality goods.
There is also an empirical literature on the relationship between competition and qual-
ity, with studies from several di¤erent industries. Mazzeo (2003) uses the frequency of
on-time ight departures as a measure of quality in the US airline industry and nds
a positive correlation between competition and quality. Using questionnaire data from
the UK, Domberger and Sherr (1989) show that the introduction of competition for con-
veyancing services led not only to price reductions, but also to an increase in the quality
of the legal services o¤ered. While both of these studies point to a clear-cut positive rela-
tionship between competition and quality, a more mixed picture emanates from studies of
competition and quality in the banking industry. Dick (2007) nds that quality is higher
in more dominant banks, while Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) nd that increased competition
has di¤erent e¤ects on quality, depending on whether the competitors are single-market
banks (negative correlation) or multi-market banks (positive correlation). The picture is
also mixed for the case of competition in health care markets, where quality is clearly a
key issue. For example, Dranove et al. (1992) and Sari (2002) nd a positive correlation
between hospital competition and quality using US data, while Propper et al. (2004) nd
a negative correlation using UK data.4
Clearly, the spatial competition framework we use in our analysis is relevant for many
markets, including the specic ones mentioned above. In retail markets, for example, out-
lets are spatially di¤erentiated due to di¤erent physical locations, and retailers may use
price and service (quality) in order to get consumers to buy from them. The assumption
that utility is non-linear in income implies that our analysis is particularly relevant for
markets where the purchasing decision can be described as a discrete choice with income
e¤ects. One example is automobile markets, where the consumer typically buys one car
from the most preferred dealer and the purchase expenditures usually constitute a sig-
4For more references, see the comprehensive survey by Gaynor (2006) on competition and quality in
health care markets.
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nicant fraction of the consumers income. While income e¤ects are obviously relevant
in the demand for cars, we would expect income e¤ects to be present also in markets for
numerous other commodities that are relatively expensive, like TVs, Hi-Fi, furnitures, etc.
This will certainly also be the case in private markets for health care and education. In
such markets, the quality dimension is also highly important.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we outline the
model and derive the equilibrium price and quality under the assumption of simultaneous
choices. In Section 3 we analyse the e¤ects of competition on prices and quality, measuring
an increase in competition intensity either as a reduction of (monetary or non-monetary)
transportation costs or as an increase in the number of rms in the market. In Section
4 we derive the socially optimal level of quality and characterise the welfare properties of
the Nash equilibrium. In Section 5 we consider the case of sequential quality and price
decisions in a simplied version of the model. The paper is concluded in Section 6.
2 Model
There are n rms equidistantly located on a circle with circumference equal to 1, each
o¤ering a product at price pi, i = 1; :::; n. Consumers are located on the circle according
to a density function f (). We assume that f is identical and symmetric between any two
rms, and the total consumer mass is normalised to 1. Each consumer buys one unit of
the product from the most preferred rm. If a consumer buys from Firm i, her utility is
given by a function Ui (qi; di; y), where qi is the quality of the product sold by Firm i, di
is the distance between the consumer and Firm i, and y is a composite numeraire good.
Assuming a separable additive form, we write the utility function as
Ui = v + b (qi)  tg (di) + u (y) ; (1)
with
y = Y   pi   h (di) ; (2)
6
where Y is gross income. The utility derived from product quality is given by the function
b (qi), where bq > 0 and bqq  0. Transportation costs can be both monetary (e.g.,
travelling costs) and non-monetary (e.g., time costs or the disutility of consuming a less-
than-ideal product variety). The former is captured by h (di), where hd > 0 and hdd  0,
while the latter is captured by tg (di), where gd > 0 and gdd  0. We also assume that
utility is concave in consumption of the numeraire good: uy > 0, uyy  0.
The distance between any two rms is equal to 1=n, and we assume that v is su¢ ciently
large to ensure full market coverage in equilibrium. If we let Firm i be located at zero and
measure distance clockwise, the consumer who is indi¤erent between buying from Firm i
and Firm i+ 1 is located at z+, implicitly given by:
b(qi) tg(z+)+u(Y  pi h(z+)) = b(qi+1) tg

1
n
  z+

+u(Y  pi+1 h( 1
n
 z+)): (3)
An equivalent condition determines the location of the consumer who is indi¤erent between
Firm i and Firm i  1, denoted by z . Total demand for Firm i is then given by
Xi (pi; pi+1; pi 1; qi; qi+1; qi 1) =
Z z+
z 
f (x) dx: (4)
Once we derive the demand function, we can specify Firm is prots as
i = piXi ()  C (Xi () ; qi) ; (5)
where CX > 0, CXX  0, CXq ? 0, Cq > 0, Cqq > 0. Notice that we allow for both
cost complementarity (CXq < 0) and cost substitutability (CXq > 0) between output and
quality.
Assume that all n rms choose price and quality simultaneously. The rst-order con-
ditions for Firm is prot-maximising choice of price and quality are then given by5
@i
@pi
= Xi + [pi   CX (Xi; qi)] @Xi
@pi
= 0; (6)
5The second-order conditions are satised if the cost function is su¢ ciently convex in quality.
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@i
@qi
= [pi   CX (Xi; qi)] @Xi
@qi
  Cq (Xi; qi) = 0: (7)
By solving (6) for (pi   CX) and substituting into (7), we can express (7) as
 
Xi
@Xi
@qi
@Xi
@pi
  Cq (Xi; qi) = 0: (8)
Since the model is symmetric, all rms will choose the same price and quality in equilib-
rium. If pi 1 = pi+1 and qi 1 = qi+1, total demand for Firm i is given by
Xi (pi; p i) = 2
Z z+
0
f(x)dx = 2F (z+): (9)
Given pi 1 = pi+1 and qi 1 = qi+1, we can totally di¤erentiate (6)-(7) to nd @z=@pi and
@z=@qi, and use (9) to calculate the partial derivatives of total demand with respect to
price and quality, respectively:
@Xi
@pi
=   2f (z+)uy
t

gd (z+) + gd
 
1
n   z+

+ uy

hd (z+) + hd
 
1
n   z+
 < 0; (10)
@Xi
@qi
=
2f (z+) bq
t

gd (z+) + gd
 
1
n   z+

+ uy

hd (z+) + hd
 
1
n   z+
 > 0: (11)
Using (10) and (11), the unique symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is given by (6)
and (8). Setting pi = p and qi = q, i = 1; ::; n, and noting that F (z+) = z+ = 12n in
the symmetric equilibrium, the equilibrium price and quality are given by the following
system of equations:6
Vp :=
1
n
 

p   CX
 
1
n ; q
 f   12nuy  Y   p   h   12n
tgd
 
1
2n

+ hd
 
1
2n

uy
 
Y   p   h   12n = 0; (12)
Vq :=
bq (q
)
nuy
 
Y   p   h   12n   Cq

1
n
; q

= 0: (13)
6Equilibrium existence requires that there are no incentives for price undercutting (see DAspremont
et al., 1979) and that there are no incentives for "ruinous" quality competition, i.e., that the equilibrium
candidate (p; q) yields non-negative prots (see Brekke et al., 2006). With (weakly) convex transportation
cost functions, both requirements are met if the distance between rms is not too small.
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3 Price and quality e¤ects of competition
In spatial competition models, a standard competition measure is the (inverse of) trans-
portation cost. Lower transportation costs increase the degree of substitutability between
the products o¤ered by di¤erent rms, which intensies competition. In a Salop model,
we can also use the number of rms as a measure of the intensity of competition. In the
following, we will use both of these measures to analyse the e¤ects of increased competition
on equilibrium prices and quality.
3.1 Transportation costs
In our model, we have two di¤erent measures of transportation costs, where the parameter
t measures the non-monetary costs while the parameter  measures the monetary ones.
Using Cramers rule, the e¤ects of t on the equilibrium price and quality are given by7
@p
@t
=
[p   CX ] f( 12n)gd
h
uyCqq   bqqn
i
2
(14)
and
@q
@t
=
[p   CX ] f( 12n)gdbquyy
2nuy
; (15)
where  := tgd + hduy > 0 and  := VppVqq   VpqVqp > 0.
Proposition 1 Lower non-monetary transportation costs a¤ect equilibrium prices and
quality as follows:
(i) If utility is linear in income, prices fall while quality is una¤ected;
(ii) If utility is strictly concave in income, prices fall while quality increases.
The result that more competition reduces prices is standard and deserves no further
explanation. The e¤ect on quality is less obvious. Increased substitutability implies that
demand becomes more responsive to both price and quality, as we can see from (10) and
(11). This gives each rm an incentive to reduce the price and increase quality. However,
7The details of all the comparative statics calculations in this section are given in the Appendix.
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a price reduction implies a lower price-cost margin, which reduces the incentive to provide
quality, as we can see from (7). Due to these two counteracting e¤ects, the total equilib-
rium e¤ect of increased substitutability on quality is a priori ambiguous. Our results show
that the total e¤ect depends crucially on the marginal utility of income. If the marginal
utility is constant, the two e¤ects cancel each other out and the equilibrium quality level is
independent of t, as in Ma and Burgess (1993) and Gravelle (1999). However, if utility is
strictly concave, the indirect e¤ect on quality incentives through a lower price-cost margin
is reduced, implying that lower non-monetary transportation costs will increase the equi-
librium supply of quality. Thus, with a decreasing marginal utility of income, consumers
benet from more competition (measured as a reduction of non-monetary transportation
costs) along all dimensions as prices fall while quality increases.
Our other (inverse) measure of the degree of substitutability is the monetary trans-
portation costs, reected by the parameter  . Again, using Cramers rule, the e¤ects of a
marginal change in  on equilibrium price and quality are given by
@p
@
=
f
 
1
2n

hd
uy
24CXquyybq
n
+
 
tgduyy + u
2
y

(p   CX)

uyCqq   bqqn


35 ; (16)
@q
@
=
[tgd + hduy + uy [p
   CX ]] f
 
1
2n

bqhduyy
2nuy
: (17)
Proposition 2 Lower monetary transportation costs a¤ect equilibrium prices and quality
as follows:
(i) If utility is linear in income, prices fall while quality is una¤ected;
(ii) If utility is strictly concave in income, quality increases and prices may also in-
crease if CXq > 0 and/or t is su¢ ciently high.
As for the case of non-monetary transportation costs, the price and quality e¤ects of
lower monetary transportation costs depend crucially on whether the marginal utility of
income is constant or decreasing. As before, the e¤ect on quality is zero in the former
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case and positive in the latter.8 The qualitative di¤erence between monetary and non-
monetary costs is the potential e¤ect on equilibrium prices, where a reduction in  might
actually lead to higher prices in equilibrium. If uyy < 0, prices may increase if there is
su¢ ciently strong cost substitutability between quality and output. The reason is that,
if CXq > 0, a higher quality level increases the marginal cost of production, which puts
an upward pressure on prices. Notice, however, that a price increase is only a possibility
under decreasing marginal utility of income. If uyy = 0, quality is una¤ected by monetary
transportation costs and the above mentioned e¤ect on prices via the cost function is thus
absent.
3.2 Firm density
In order to simplify the analysis somewhat, we assume here that the distribution of con-
sumers is uniform around the circle, implying that f () = 1. Let us rst consider the
relationship between n and p, which is given by
@p
@n
=  
0@Cqq   bqqnuy
n2
1A"1 + uyCXX

+
(p   CX)
 
u2yhdd + tuygdd + tgdhduyy

22
#
+
CXquy
n2

CXq   bq
uy
  bqhduyy
2nu2y

: (18)
The sign of this expression is generally ambiguous. In the standard versions of the model,
where uyy = 0 and CXq = 0, we see that the sign is negative and we get the expected
result that a higher number of rms leads to lower prices. However, if the marginal utility
of income is decreasing, this result might potentially be reversed. We can see this more
clearly by considering the special case of constant marginal production and transportation
costs, and cost independence between output and quality: CXX = hdd = gdd = CXq = 0.
8Notice that there is a qualitative di¤erence between monetary and non-monetary transportation costs
only if utility is non-linear in income. Thus, the rst parts of Propositions 1 and 2 are necessarily equal.
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In this case, the relationship between n and p is given by
dp
dn
=  
(Cqq   bqqnuy )
n2

1 +
(p   CX) tgdhd
22
uyy

; (19)
which is positive if uyy is su¢ ciently large in absolute value. The e¤ect that works in
the "counterintuitive" direction is the following: for given (and symmetric) prices and
qualities, a higher rm density implies that the net income of the marginal (indi¤erent)
consumer increases due to lower monetary transportation costs. If utility is strictly concave
in income, this means that the marginal utility of income decreases, which, in turn, reduces
the demand responsiveness to prices (cf. (10)). All else equal, this e¤ect provides an
incentive to increase prices.
The e¤ect of a higher number of rms on the equilibrium quality is given by
@q
@n
=
 
uy [p
   CX ] [2tngd (bq   uyCXq)  bq (tgdd + uyhdd)]  bq 
22n3u2y
!
uyy
 

bq   uyCXq
n2

; (20)
where  := 2gdt + 3hduy + 2uyCXX > 0. The sign of (20) is generally ambiguous. In
the case of constant marginal utility of income (uyy = 0), we see that equilibrium quality
is increasing in the number of rms if the degree of cost substitutability between output
and quality is su¢ ciently high: CXq > bq=uy. In the special case of CXq = 0, equilibrium
quality is inversely related to the number of rms, since more rms reduce the potential
demand for each rm, thereby reducing the gain of providing high-quality products. This
corresponds exactly to the case analysed by Economides (1993), where uyy = CXq = 0.
However, if there is cost substitutability between output and quality, a higher number
of rms in the market reduces the marginal cost of quality improvements due to the
lower level of demand facing each rm. If this second e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong, the
negative relationship between n and q may be reversed.9 The sign of @q=@n is harder to
9Both e¤ects are present in Gravelle (1999), where uy = bq = 1 and C (X; q) = q2X. With this
particular formulation, it turns out that the two e¤ects exactly cancel each other out and quality is
independent of the number of rms in the market.
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characterise if the marginal utility of income is decreasing (uyy < 0) and the only general
conclusion that can be drawn is that the relationship between q and n is ambiguous.
We summarise the above discussion as follows:
Proposition 3 (i) If utility is linear in income and the marginal cost of providing quality
is independent of output, a higher number of rms leads to lower prices in equilibrium.
This relationship might be reversed if utility is strictly concave in income.
(ii) If utility is linear in income, a higher number of rms leads to higher quality in
equilibrium if the degree of cost substitutability between output and quality is su¢ ciently
high. If utility is concave in income, the relationship between the number of rms and
equilibrium quality is generally ambiguous.
3.3 A parametric example
For illustrative purposes, consider the following parametric example where utility is loga-
rithmic in income and linear in quality and distance: u (y) =  ln y, b (qi) = bqi and h (d) =
g (d) = d. We also assume a linear-quadratic cost function: C (Xi; qi) = cX+Xiqi+ k2q
2
i ,
where c > 0, k > 0 and  7 0.
By using these specic functional forms in (12)-(13), we derive the following explicit
expressions for equilibrium price and quality:
p =
(2Y n  ) (kt+ b) + 2n  k ( + cn)  2
2 (kt+ b+ kn)n
; (21)
q =
2nb (Y   c)  2 (t+ n)  3b
2 (kt+ b+ kn)n
: (22)
The comparative statics results with respect to the di¤erent measures of competition
intensity are given by
@p
@t
=
yk
(kn + kt+ b)
> 0;
@q
@t
=   y
b
(kn + kt+ b)n
< 0; (23)
@p
@
=
k (2n   t)  b
2n (kn + kt+ b)
7 0; @q

@
=   3b
2 (kn + kt+ b)n
< 0; (24)
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@p
@n
=
  (kt+ b) (2nk (n (Y   c)  )   (kt+ b)) + 22n2k  2   k
2 (kt+ b+ kn)2 n2
7 0; (25)
@q
@n
=
2nk ( (2t+ n) + 3b   nb (Y   c)) + (kt+ b) (3b + 2t)
2 (kt+ b+ kn)2 n2
7 0; (26)
where y = Y   p   2n is the net income of the marginal (indi¤erent) consumers in
equilibrium.
The results from this example conrm the analysis of the general model. Here, we see
that a higher value of  increases the parameter space for which equilibrium quality is
increasing in the number of rms. However, for certain parameter congurations, a positive
relationship between q and n can also be established even for (mild) cost complementarity
between output and quality (i.e.,  < 0). Numerical simulations also suggest that a price
increase due to a higher number of rms appears only for a very restricted parameter
conguration.
4 Social welfare
Does the market provide the socially optimal level of quality? Suppose that the government
can provide output and quality directly, and nance the cost of provision through a lump-
sum tax T . Applying symmetry, the rst-best level of quality  equal for all rms  is
such that it maximises the utilitarian welfare function
W = v + b (q) + 2n
Z 1
2n
0
[u (Y   T   h(x))  tg (x)] f (x) dx (27)
subject to the resource constraint
T = nC

1
n
; q

: (28)
By inserting (28) into (27), yielding
W = v + b (q) + 2n
Z 1
2n
0

u

Y   nC

1
n
; q

  h(x)

  tg (x)

f (x) dx; (29)
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and maximising with respect to q, the socially optimal level of quality is implicitly given
by
bq (q
s)
2n
R 1
2n
0 uy
 
Y   nC   1n ; qs  h(x) f (x) dx = nCq

1
n
; qs

: (30)
Notice that the denominator on the LHS of (30) is the marginal utility of income for the
average consumer (with the average taken across distance). Thus, the socially optimal
level of quality is characterised by the ratio of the marginal utility of quality and the
marginal utility of income for the average consumer being equal to the marginal cost of
quality provision.
The Nash equilibrium level of quality, on the other hand, is implicitly given by
bq (q
)
uy
 
Y   p   h   12n = nCq

1
n
; q

; (31)
where the denominator on the LHS is the marginal utility of income for the marginal
consumer, who is indi¤erent between two rms. Consequently, the di¤erence between
the Nash equilibrium level of quality (q) and the socially optimal level (qs) depends on
how the marginal utility of income compares for the average and marginal consumers,
respectively.
Proposition 4 (i) If utility is linear in income, the Nash equilibrium level of quality
coincides with the socially optimal level.
(ii) If utility is strictly concave in income, the Nash equilibrium level of quality is lower
than the socially optimal level.
The rst part of the proposition conrms the result reported in Ma and Burgess (1993),
and shows that this result generalises beyond specic forms of the transportation and
production cost functions. However, this result hinges crucially on the assumption of
constant marginal utility of income. Comparing (30) and (31), notice that p  nC   1n ; q,
since, when the population is normalised to one, nC
 
1
n ; q

can be interpreted as the average
cost of production. Moreover, notice also that h
 
1
2n
  h(x) for any x. Thus, when
comparing (30) and (31), we see that the income of the marginal consumer in the Nash
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equilibrium is lower than the average income in the rst-best solution. With diminishing
marginal utility of income, this means that, for q = q, the marginal utility of income for
the average consumer is higher than the marginal cost of quality provision, implying an
underprovision of quality in the Nash equilibrium.
It follows from Proposition 4 that increased competition a¤ects the welfare properties
of the Nash equilibrium only in the case of diminishing marginal utility of income (or,
more generally, if utility is non-linear in income). The e¤ects of reduced non-monetary
transportation costs are fairly straightforward. Since the rst-best level of quality does
not depend on non-monetary transportation costs, a reduction in t will unambiguously
improve welfare since equilibrium quality increases towards the rst-best level.10 Monetary
transportation costs, on the other hand, a¤ect both q and qs. However, notice that a
reduction in  reduces the di¤erence between transportation costs for the average and
marginal consumers, respectively. If, in addition, a reduction in  also leads to a price
reduction, the di¤erence between quality levels in the Nash equilibrium and the rst-best
solution are unambiguously reduced.
The welfare e¤ect of an increase in the number of rms is considerably more involved
and depends, inter alia, on the characteristics of the cost function. Using the parametric
example from Section 3.3 it can be shown (by numerical simulations) that the e¤ect is
generally ambiguous. This naturally reects that fact that @q=@n 7 0.
5 Sequential quality and price choices
In this section we extend the main analysis by considering the case where the quality
and price choices are made sequentially. More specically, we consider a game with the
following order of moves:
Stage 1: Firms choose qualities (qi) simultaneously and independently.
Stage 2: Firms choose prices (pi) simultaneously and independently.
10 In (31), notice that a reduction in t a¤ects q through a reduction in p.
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By introducing sequential decision making, the analysis is severely complicated. Thus,
in order to facilitate analytical tractability, we make a number of simplifying assumptions:
b(qi) = bqi, g (d) = d,  = 0, f(x) = 1, CXq = 0 and n = 2. This means that we restrict
attention to our most important generalisation: allowing utility to be concave in income.
When n = 2, total demand for Firm i is given by 2z+, where z+ is implicitly given by
(3). When  = 0, we can solve (3) explicitly and derive demand for Firm i as
Xi (pi; pj ; qi; qj) =
1
2
+
b [qi   qj ] + u(Y   pi)  u(Y   pj)
t
: (32)
5.1 The price subgame
For a given pair of quality levels, (qi; qj), the equilibrium in the price subgame is charac-
terised by the rst-order condition
@i
@pi
= Xi ()  [pi   CX ]uy (Y   pi)
t
= 0; (33)
from which we can derive the relationships between qualities and prices. Applying Cramers
rule, these comparative statics results are given by
@pi
@qi
= b

uy(Y   pj)  [pj   CX ]uyy(Y   pj)
p

> 0 (34)
and
@pi
@qj
= b

[pi   CX ]uyy(Y   pi)  uy(Y   pi)
p

< 0; (35)
where p > 0 is dened as
p : = ([pi   CX ]uyy (Y   pi)  2uy(Y   pi)) (pi   CXuyy (Y   pi)  2uy(Y   pi))
 uy(Y   pi)uy(Y   pj): (36)
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5.2 Quality choices
Using the equilibrium values of the price subgame, we can express Firm is prots as a
function of qualities only. The rst-order condition for Firm is prot-maximising choice
of quality level is
@i
@qi
=
@pi
@qi
Xi +
(pi   CX)
t

b  uy(Y   pi)@pi
@qi
+ uy(Y   pj)@pj
@qi

  Cq = 0: (37)
Applying symmetry and using (32) and (34)-(35), equilibrium quality is characterised by
b

uy   (p   c)uyy
2q

+

p  CX
t

b  2buy [uy   (p  CX)uyy]
q

  Cq = 0 (38)
where
q := (p  c)2 u2yy + 3u2y   4 (p  c)uyyuy > 0: (39)
5.3 Equilibrium analysis
From (33) we see that, in the symmetric equilibrium, prices do not depend on quality
levels. This is due to the assumption of cost independence between quality and output
(CXq = 0), and also implies that equilibrium prices are identical in the simultaneous and
sequential versions of the game. Comparing (12) and (33), we see that the equilibrium
price in both versions of the game is characterised by p = CX + t2uy . We can use this
expression to characterise the equilibrium quality as follows:
b
2
"
1
uy
 
 
uy   tuyy2uy

!#
= Cq: (40)
Comparing (13) and (40), we see that equilibrium quality is lower if price and quality
choices are made sequentially. The di¤erence is represented by the second term in the
square brackets of (40). This conrms that the "underinvestment" result reported by Ma
and Burgess (1993) is robust to the assumption of decreasing marginal utility of income.
We already know from Proposition 4 that, if utility is concave in income, quality is below
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the socially optimal level in the simultaneous price-quality game. Thus, equilibrium quality
is even more suboptimal if quality and price decisions are made sequentially.
In order to examine the e¤ect of competition on prices and quality when these are
determined sequentially, we apply the following functional forms: u (y) =  ln y and
C (Xi; qi) = cXi +
k
2q
2
i . This allows us to derive closed-form solutions for the equilib-
rium price and quality:
p =
2c + Y t
t+ 2
; (41)
q =
b (Y   c) (t+ 4)
k (t+ 6) (t+ 2)
: (42)
In this simplied version of the model, the degree of competition is (inversely) measured
by the parameter t. The e¤ects of changes in the degree of competition on equilibrium
prices and quality are given by
@p
@t
=
2 (Y   c)
(t+ 2)2
> 0 (43)
and
@q
@t
=  
 
202 + 8t + t2

(Y   c)
(t+ 2)2 (t+ 6)2 k
< 0: (44)
Thus, the competition e¤ects on prices and quality are in this example qualitatively unaf-
fected by whether the decisions are taken simultaneously or sequentially. As long as utility
is strictly concave in income, a more competitive market (measured as a reduction in t)
produces lower prices and higher quality in equilibrium.
We can also use this parameterisation to say something about how the di¤erence
between quality levels under simultaneous and sequential decision making depends on the
degree of competition in the market. Denoting equilibrium quality with simultaneous and
sequential decisions by, respectively, q and q, the degree of "underinvestment" due to
sequential decision making is given by
q   q = 4 (t+ 2) k (Y   c) b
2 (t+ 6) (t+ 2)2 k2
> 0; (45)
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from which we derive
@ (q   q)
@t
=  4 (t+ 4) (Y   c) b
(t+ 2)2 (t+ 6)2 k
< 0: (46)
Thus, the degree of underinvestment is larger in more competitive markets (lower t). This
is quite intuitive, since the underinvestment results stems from what Ma and Burgess dub
"the price undercutting e¤ect"; i.e., incentives for quality investments at the rst stage are
dampened by the fact that the rival rm will "compensate" by undercutting its price at
the next stage. The incentive for such price undercutting is stronger in more competitive
markets, where demand reacts more strongly to price changes.
6 Concluding remarks
The relationship between competition and quality is theoretically ambiguous when rms
also compete in prices. Within a framework of spatial competition, we have shown in
this paper that the e¤ect of competition on quality depends crucially on the presence
of income e¤ects on the demand side and cost dependence between output and quality
on the supply side. More specically, if we use transportation costs (i.e., the degree of
horizontal di¤erentiation) as an inverse measure of competition intensity, more competition
will always increase quality in equilibrium if the marginal utility of income is decreasing. If
we measure competition intensity by the number of rms in the market, we nd a positive
relationship between competition and quality also for the case of constant marginal utility
of income, provided that there is a su¢ cient degree of cost substitutability between output
and quality. Thus, when seen in conjunction with existing theoretical literature, our results
suggest that the scope for spatial competition to stimulate quality provision is larger than
previously thought.
The presence of income e¤ects on the demand side also implies that, from a social
welfare perspective, the market provides a sub-optimal level of quality even in the case
where prices and quality are chosen simultaneously, a result which is also new to the litera-
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ture. More specically, if utility is strictly concave in income, equilibrium quality is always
below the socially optimal level. Thus, although clear-cut and unambiguous conclusions
are hard to reach, due to the general nature of our model, our results seem to suggest
that the scope for welfare-enhancing competition is larger than previously indicated in the
literature on spatial price-quality competition.
Appendix
Using the notation Vxy := @Vx@y , we derive, from (12)-(13), the following expressions:
Vpp =  
f
 
1
2n

[uy  (p  CX)uyytgd]
2
< 0; (A1)
Vqq =
bqq
nuy
  Cqq < 0; (A2)
Vpq =
CXqf
 
1
2n

uy

7 0; (A3)
Vqp =
bquyy
n (uy)
2  0; (A4)
Vpt =
(p  CX) f
 
1
2n

uygd
2
> 0; (A5)
Vqt = 0; (A6)
Vp =
(p  CX) f
 
1
2n
 
uyyhdtgd + (uy)
2 hd

2
7 0; (A7)
Vq =
bqhduyy
n (uy)
2  0; (A8)
Vpn =   1
n2
0@1 + CXXuy

+
(p  CX)

(uy)
2 hdd + uytgdd + tgduyyhd

22
1A 7 0; (A9)
Vqn =   1
n2
 
bq
uy
+
bquyyhd
2n (uy)
2   CXq
!
7 0: (A10)
The comparative statics results reported in equations (14), (15), (16), (17), (18) and
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(20) are then found by using Cramers rule:
@p
@t
=  

Vpt Vpq
Vqt Vqq

Vpp Vpq
Vqp Vqq

;
@p
@
=  

Vp Vpq
Vq Vqq

Vpp Vpq
Vqp Vqq

;
@p
@n
=  

Vpn Vpq
Vqn Vqq

Vpp Vpq
Vqp Vqq

;
@q
@t
=  

Vpp Vpt
Vqp Vqt

Vpp Vpq
Vqp Vqq

;
@q
@
=  

Vpp Vp
Vqp Vq

Vpp Vpq
Vqp Vqq

;
@q
@n
=  

Vpp Vpn
Vqp Vqn

Vpp Vpq
Vqp Vqq

:
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